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This paper investigates whether government regulation crowds out intrinsic
motivation to improve environmental performance of small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). Motivation crowding is the phenomenon by which external
pressures reduce intrinsic motivation. Literature on motivation crowding effects of
environmental regulations exhibits two gaps. First, previous studies have focused on
households while neglecting business organizations, even though businesses account
for a major part of industrial pollution worldwide. Second, previous literature neither
measured intrinsic motivation nor tested how government regulation affects this
motivation. Empirical evidence of motivation crowding by environmental regulations
is therefore still lacking. This paper fills both research gaps. Using a dataset of
2,373 SMEs from 12 European countries, we show that government regulation
enhances environmental performance directly but harms it indirectly by crowding
out intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of business leaders. It only stimulates
environmental performance for companies exhibiting low motivation.
Keywords: motivation crowding theory; environmental performance; government
regulation; intrinsic motivation; small- and medium-sized enterprises
1. Introduction
The literature on motivation crowding has theorized that incentives-based policies
designed to recruit self-interest might harm the intrinsic motivation to supply public
goods (Boyer, Dwenger, and Rincke 2016). Also, in the environmental domain, studies
have shown that price incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivations (Pellerano et al.
2017). These effects also pertain to other types of external interventions, such as gov-
ernment regulation. In an influential paper, Cardenas, Stranlund, and Willis (2000)
showed that the introduction of modestly enforced government-imposed regulations in
three rural villages in Colombia increased resource extraction. They suggested that one
of the interpretations of this finding is that regulation crowds out other-regarding
behavior. Also, Vollan (2008) found that imposing external penalties through outside
regulations tends to worsen the situation, whereas employing enabling rewards does
not. Recent research by Abatayo and Lynham (2016), however, did not confirm this
finding. They found no differences between externally imposed regulations and
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self-governing regulations and between weak externally imposed regulation and no
regulation. They concluded that externally imposed regulations do not crowd out
intrinsic motivation. In contrast, Choi (2015) found that a mandatory carbon price
reduces the willingness to pay for voluntary carbon offsets, whereas Han et al. (2018)
found that an increase in garbage fees crowds out households’ pre-existing motivations
for sorting waste, again supporting the crowding-out mechanism.1
The literature on motivation crowding in the environmental domain has focused
only on the behavior of individuals or households. How government intervention
impacts on the intrinsic motives of firms has neither been theorized nor empirically
tested, even though business organizations are a major source of environmental dam-
age. This paper takes a first step to fill this research gap by focusing on the motiva-
tions of top managers of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to adopt
corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSR). Compared to their larger
counterparts, the behavior of small firms is disproportionately driven by the values and
motives of the managers (Wickert, Scherer, and Spence 2016). Therefore, crowding-
out effects are more likely to occur for SMEs than for large companies.
A second shortcoming of previous studies on crowding effects of government regu-
lation of environmental behavior is that they researched the relationship between vari-
ous types of regulations and environmental outcomes without measuring intrinsic
motivation and testing how intrinsic motivation affects this relationship between regu-
lation and environmental performance. In a literature overview of 18 studies on the
impact of economic incentives on conservation policy, Rode, Gomez-Baggethun, and
Krause (2015) found that only four studies measure intrinsic motivation (of which,
none investigated the effects of government regulation). They argue that explicit infor-
mation about intrinsic motivation is essential to develop an understanding of the spe-
cific conditions under which crowding effects occur, as “observing behaviour does not
make it possible to isolate economic from intrinsic motivations” (Rode, Gomez-
Baggethun, and Krause 2015, 280). If government regulation is found to improve
environmental performance, the literature interprets this finding as evidence that
crowding out of intrinsic motivation does not occur. However, it cannot be ruled out
that other factors affect this relationship. Empirical evidence on whether government
regulation crowds out intrinsic motivation is therefore still lacking. Our research fills
this second research gap by measuring intrinsic motivation and testing how govern-
ment regulation impacts this motivation. Our results show that a positive relationship
between government regulation and environmental performance actually goes together
with crowding out of intrinsic motivation. We thus correct the standard interpretation
in the literature that a positive relationship between government regulation and envir-
onmental performance implies that crowding out of intrinsic motivation is absent.
Our research question is therefore twofold. First, to what extent does government
regulation crowd out intrinsic motivation toward environmental performance in SMEs?
Second, how do indirect effects caused by crowding out of intrinsic motivation com-
pare with the direct effects of government regulation on environmental performance?
The paper thus contributes to the previous literature on motivation crowding in envir-
onmental economics in two important ways. First, instead of analyzing individual or
household behavior, we research to what extent government regulation crowds out
intrinsic motivation toward the environmental performance of SMEs. This is important
because small businesses collectively account for up to 70% of industrial pollution
worldwide (Hillary 2000). Second, by separating the effect of government regulation
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on intrinsic motivation from its direct effect on environmental performance, our study
is the first to empirically identify crowding out of intrinsic motivation by government
regulation. Our approach allows us to disentangle the effects of government regulation
on environmental performance caused by crowding out of intrinsic motivation from
other effects of government regulation on environmental performance.
Below, we first develop a conceptual framework for exploring how government
regulation influences voluntary initiatives to protect the environment through the inter-
mediation of motivations of top managers of SMEs. Next, we discuss the methodology
for our research, which is based on a survey of 2,373 SMEs from 12 European coun-
tries. Then, we report the results of the data analysis, which includes tests on common
source bias, non-response bias and endogeneity bias. Section four presents the estima-
tion results and various types of robustness analyses. The last section summarizes and
discusses the findings.
2. Conceptual framework
This section first discusses how the motivation of business leaders affects voluntary
initiatives to improve the environmental performance of SMEs (Hypotheses 1 and 2).
Voluntary initiatives are activities that companies perform on a voluntary basis. These
initiatives are, thus, not the consequence of government regulations spelling out the
type of activities the business should undertake or environmental performance stand-
ards with which the company should comply. Environmental performance in this study
encompasses environmentally responsible business practices (Post, Rahman, and
McQuillen 2015). Next, we describe the tenets of motivation crowding theory and pro-
vide reasons why government regulation may crowd out intrinsic and extrinsic motiva-
tions of business leaders (Hypotheses 3 and 4). This part concerns the main
contribution of this paper. Finally, we present the overall conceptual framework.
2.1. Motivation and environmental performance of small businesses
Motivation refers to the reason upon which one acts. The literature distinguishes between
intrinsic motives and extrinsic motives (Frey 1998; Weaver, Trevi~no, and Cochran 1999;
Lindenberg 2001; Scopelliti 2018). Business leaders who feature intrinsic motives for
improving environmental performance perceive good environmental performance as
an end in itself, independent of other (mostly financial) benefits (Muller and Kolk
2010). An extrinsic motive encourages environmental performance because it has
instrumental value for goals other than good environmental performance.
Various types of intrinsic motivation exist (Lindenberg 2001). First, in Deci,
Koestner, and Ryan (1999), enjoyment or fun derived from the activity is at the heart
of the conceptualization of intrinsic motivation. For example, business people may
enjoy a ‘warm glow’ from contributing to a public good. However, as argued by Frey
(1998) and Lindenberg (2001), intrinsic motivation may also involve moral obligations.
This motivation stems from the feeling that one must follow a particular rule, norm or
principle. The goal is to act appropriately. Business leaders feel that they are respon-
sible for preventing negative impacts of their companies on the natural environment.
As regards extrinsic motivations, business leaders may pursue environmental poli-
cies for other reasons than a cleaner environment. An important reason is enhancing
the company’s reputation among stakeholders and the (long-term) financial
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performance of the company. As theorized by the resource-based theory and by instru-
mental stakeholder theory (Surroca, Tribo, and Waddock 2010), corporate environmen-
tal responsibility may enhance the company’s market position by improving its
reputation on the financial market, output market and the labor market (Jones,
Willness, and Madey 2014).
Although it seems obvious that motives drive behavior, in the context of business
organizations, the role of motives is more complex because motivation is basically an
individual-level construct rather than a company-level construct (Katz and Kahn 1978).
We bypass this theoretical concern by focusing our research on director-owners of
SMEs. As regards the behavior of businesses, the upper echelon theory argues that
organizational strategies reflect the values and beliefs of powerful actors in the organ-
ization (Hambrick and Mason 1984). Business leaders are shaping the strategic direc-
tion of their company. Their motives, therefore, affect the strategic initiatives of the
firm, such as engaging in CSR to enhance environmental performance. The dominant
influence of leaders in defining the interests of the company will be particularly strong
for business leaders of SMEs. They are often directly involved in decisions on CSR
and can change the CSR strategy of the firm substantially (Waldman, Siegel, and
Javidan 2006). Their value-laden decisions are observed and interpreted by subordi-
nates and will also influence the subordinates’ values, beliefs and behavior (Kim et al.
2017). As the leader with high status and power, the business leader will, in fact, serve
as a role model for the employees in the organization and foster their cooperation in
the implementation of environmental policies. Lynch-Wood and Williamson (2014)
found that in smaller firms the responsibility for environmental issues tends to reside
with owners or directors, whereas in larger firms it is often delegated. The motives of
business leaders of SMEs, therefore, have a decisive influence on the company’s poli-
cies. These arguments yield the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The stronger the intrinsic CSR motivation of its business leader, the more
voluntary initiatives an SME will undertake to improve its environmental performance.
Hypothesis 2. The stronger the extrinsic CSR motivation of its business leader, the more
voluntary initiatives an SME will undertake to improve its environmental performance.
2.2. Government regulation and motivations
Motivation crowding theory has recognized that external pressures may crowd out
intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen 2001). However, whether government regulation
crowds out intrinsic motivation of business leaders of SMEs to improve environmental
performance has not yet been researched. Motivation crowding theory provides various
reasons for the crowding-out phenomenon (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999; Frey and
Jegen 2001; Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012; Han et al. 2018). First, crowding out is
observed if the external pressure is perceived to be coercive, thereby reducing self-
determination and the freedom to act (Frey 1998). Compared to market incentives,
government regulations are typically perceived as more restrictive to self-determin-
ation. Government interventions interfere directly with the business leader’s realm of
self-determination. This particularly applies to hard regulations with convincing threats
of punishments for non-compliance. In that case, business leaders have no discretion
regarding how they respond to this pressure and this will reduce their enjoyment from
engaging in environmental actions.
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As the second reason for impacting intrinsic motivation, government regulation
may affect the salience of moral preferences by framing effects. In particular, the regu-
lation may frame choice behavior of business leaders in terms of the self-interest of
avoiding government intervention rather than the responsibility for the common good
of protecting a public good. Ostman (1998) suggests that external control of common-
pool resources increases an orientation on self-interest, as it shifts responsibility to the
regulatory agency and thereby absolves individuals from other-regarding moral obliga-
tions. However, the framing argument can also explain crowding in (meaning that reg-
ulations enforce motivations), as government regulation may provide certain cues for
appropriate moral behavior and trigger moral engagement (Bowles and Polania-Reyes
2012). Governments are, in fact, important institutional players with the ability to
influence social norms, values and societal expectations on appropriate corporate
behavior (Weaver, Trevi~no, and Cochran 1999). Government regulations may thus sig-
nal to the business leader that moral values are at stake in environmental performance,
thereby enhancing his or her intrinsic motivation.
A third channel through which government regulation crowds out intrinsic
motivation is that it conveys information about the motives of the regulator (Sliwka
2007). The implicit bad news of regulations is that they signal distrust in the busi-
ness leader’s motivation and willingness to protect the public good of the environ-
ment. Moreover, these regulations convey the desire of the regulator to control the
behavior of the company. This makes the business leader feel that his or her com-
petence and involvement are neither recognized nor appreciated by the regulator,
which leads the business leader to reduce intrinsic motivation.2 The conclusion is
that impairing self-determination and signaling lack of trust and respect provide
reasons for government regulations to crowd out the intrinsic motivation of busi-
ness leaders of SMEs to improve environmental performance. Only the framing
arguments are ambiguous.
Government regulations may not only harm intrinsic motivation, but also crowd
out extrinsic motivation. The market failures that cause environmental degradation pro-
vide companies with market opportunities to realize strategic benefits (Dean and
McMullen 2007). For example, companies that address environmental degradation may
improve their reputation and profitability (Surroca, Tribo, and Waddock 2010).
Regulatory policies addressing the negative externalities of environmental degradation
reduce these payoffs (Hunt and Fund 2016). By forcing all companies to improve their
environmental performance by meeting common standards that apply to all, govern-
ment regulations reduce opportunities for companies to distinguish themselves from
other companies.
Based on these considerations, we formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3. Government regulation crowds out the intrinsic motivation of a business
leader toward improving the environmental performance of the SME.
Hypothesis 4. Government regulation crowds out the extrinsic motivation of a business
leader toward improving the environmental performance of the SME.
2.3. Conceptual framework
We complement Hypotheses 1–4 by two other relationships of the direct effects of vol-
untary initiatives by individual companies and government regulation on environmental
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 1339
performance (A and B in Figure 1), assuming that both channels are likely to improve
a firm’s environmental performance.
Figure 1 shows that our analysis extends the literature on motivation crowding
effects in environmental economics by separating out the effects of government regula-
tion on intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. In this way, we disentangle the regulatory
impact on environmental performance caused by indirect effects due to crowding
effects on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation from the direct effects of government
regulation on environmental performance.
3. Methodology
3.1. Method of data collection
The data stem from a large survey targeted at SMEs, which was conducted in 2011.
Before sending out the survey, we discussed the survey questions in two rounds with a
research team of 14 CSR researchers from the 12 European countries where the survey
would be sent (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, The Netherlands, Germany, France,
Austria, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Spain and the UK). Second, we sought guidance from
an SME consultant who specialized in advising SMEs on their environmental out-
comes. Next, we pre-tested the survey by interviewing ten executives from companies.
We used a convenience sample (Sekaran 2003) by selecting companies from the
researchers’ local environment. The companies were selected from both manufacturing
and service sectors (food industry, construction, trade, ICT and insurance) as well as
from different size classes to explore content validity in various different contexts. We
explained the purpose and procedures to all participants of the pre-test. After receiving
the survey question list by e-mail, all participants filled in the survey for their own
company. They were asked to complete the survey before the interview was held.
Then the researchers visited the company and discussed in depth the survey questions
and the company’s responses to each question. In order to check whether the respond-
ent fully understood the survey questions and whether the questions suited the CSR of
the company, the participants were asked to explain their response to the survey ques-
tions, how they gathered the information for their responses, which questions were
unclear and why, which questions did not fit the situation of the company and why,
and which questions were lacking and why. Based on the responses of the 10 respond-
ents, the survey list was updated. The survey was translated by members of the
research team from English into their own languages for the 12 countries in which the
companies were located.
Figure 1. Conceptual framework.
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The 2011 survey was sent to 365,002 companies. The e-mail addresses of compa-
nies were obtained from KOMPASS (a French based international bureau that provides
data on companies, see www.kompass.com). The survey was sent out by CenterData
(https://www.centerdata.nl/en) which is specialized in doing online (multi-language)
surveys. The response rate was 3.7% (13,637 companies). International mail surveys
aiming at an industrial population have a history of very low response rates varying
between 6% and 16% (Harzing 1997). Since our survey targeted small businesses and
took substantial effort to fill out, the response rate is even lower and in line with ex-
ante expectations. From these responses, we selected the companies for which the
business leader (director) had filled in the surveys. This resulted in 2,373 companies
for which data for the variables used in this research are available. The average size of
these companies is equal to 22 employees Full Time Equivalents (FTEs). Using
Cochran’s sample size formula, we find that this response is adequate for inferring
reliable research findings for the total population of companies in the 12 countries.3
3.2. Measurement
The concept of CSR was introduced to the respondents as follows: “Corporate social
responsibility of enterprises is the practice whereby enterprises integrate social and
environmental concerns into their business operations on a voluntary basis, in order to
contribute to public prosperity in the longer run.” This definition of CSR, which has
also been adopted by the European Commission (2001), stresses that CSR refers to
voluntary actions.
We measured motivation by eliciting the reason for the company’s engagement in
CSR. We measured motivation by the following survey question: How important are
the following motives for your enterprise to engage in CSR?4 The intrinsic motivation
of the business leader was measured by the response to two statements reflecting on
this survey question (see Table 1). The first statement inquired into the extent to which
personal satisfaction is a motive to engage in environmental responsibility. The second
statement measured the extent to which the company engages in CSR because the
company feels responsible for the environment and society. Extrinsic motivation was
measured by the responses to three statements on the financial and reputational bene-
fits of environmental performance. The responses to all statements were measured by a
seven-point Likert scale.
In order to measure legal enforcement of environmental performance, and volun-
tary initiatives by the enterprise itself, we asked respondents to indicate which cause
contributed most to reductions in the company’s energy consumption, waste disposal
and water consumption during the period 2007–2010: legal requirements or voluntary
initiatives by the own enterprise? Two dummies for each of the causes measure the
two alternative options. For example, for legal enforcement, the dummy equals 1 if the
respondent agreed that environmental performance was improved mainly because of
legal requirements and equals 0 if the respondent did not agree. A substantial share of
business leaders did not select either of these options and, instead, selected the option
‘non-applicable’. Since the question inquired into the causes for the reduction in
energy consumption, waste disposal and water consumption, the most likely reason for
selecting the option ‘non-applicable’ is that the company did not reduce energy con-
sumption, waste disposal and/or water consumption during the period 2007–2010.
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We measured environmental performance by the use of two procedural measures:
setting targets to improve environmental outcomes and reporting the realization of
these targets. Target-setting is a proven management tool to improve environmental
performance that is also feasible for SMEs (Palmer and Van der Vorst 1997). The
establishment of voluntary targets is an essential first step. It requires the identification
and specification of concrete, measurable, performance indicators and a commitment
to management plans that specify how much they can be improved (Hummels and
Karssing 2007). Internal reporting provides an instrument for analyzing how the out-
comes realized relate to the targets (Mitchell and Hill 2009). Based on these reports,
companies can plan for improvement and redefine their targets. The advantage of sim-
ple, specific and concise questions on the use of procedural measures to measure
environmental performance is that they diminish social desirability bias (Podsakoff
et al. 2003). In fact, Wakabayashi and Arimura (2016) also employ these self-reported
data to measure environmental performance. As reported in Table 1, only 10–13% of
the companies responded that they adopt these procedural measures. These low scores
indicate that the responses to these survey questions are not biased by social desirabil-
ity bias and thus provide reasonably reliable indicators.
3.3. Control variables
We controlled for various company characteristics and external influences from the
business environment (for the measurement of the control variables, see the footnotes
for Table 2). For internal company characteristics, we controlled for company size,
time horizon, skill level, age structure and organizational culture. The number of FTEs
measures the size of the company. Organizational culture was measured by the two
dimensions distinguished by the Competing Value Framework: control versus flexibil-
ity orientation and internal versus external focus (Linnenluecke and Griffiths 2010).
We also controlled for time horizon, educational level and age structure, since these
have been shown to affect managerial beliefs, values and actions (Marginson and
Mcaulay 2008).
As regards the external environment, we controlled for region, industry, position in
the chain and intensity of competition. First, environmental performance and motiva-
tions are conditioned by the wider institutional and cultural environment of the com-
pany (Campbell 2007). We, therefore, controlled for five regional dummy variables.
Also, the sector influences the relevance of environmental policies for companies. We
distinguished eight sectors based on the Global Industry Classification Standard
(GICS). Furthermore, CSR may depend on the enterprise’s position in the chain. We
also controlled for the intensity of price competition. The more competitive the market
environment, the lower the profitability and the fewer resources a company has avail-
able for investing in social responsibility.
4. Data analysis
4.1. Factor analysis
In order to research the validity of the constructs of government regulation, voluntary
own initiatives, intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation and environmental perform-
ance, we performed principal component analysis (with Oblimin rotation). Table 1
reports the results. The factor loadings for all individual variables exceed 0.50.
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Table 1. Factor analysis of survey items.a
Factor loadings
Variables Mean SD
Government
regulation
Voluntary
initiatives
Intrinsic
motivation
Extrinsic
motivation
Environmental
performance
Lower energy
consumption
due to:
- Legal
requirementsb
0.07 0.25 0.91 – – – –
- Own voluntary
initiativesb
0.50 0.50 0.88 – – –
Lower waste
due to:
– – –
- Legal
requirementsb
0.08 0.26 0.89 – – –
- Own voluntary
initiativesb
0.40 0.49 0.85 – – –
Lower water
consumption
due to:
- Legal
requirementsb
0.06 0.24 0.93 – – –
- Own voluntary
initiativesb
0.45 0.50 0.90 – – –
We engage in
CSR because:
- My enterprise
feels
responsible for
the planet and
the societyc
5.28 1.47 – – 0.88 – –
- It creates
personal
satisfaction for
the people in
my enterprisec
5.15 1.41 – – 0.89 – –
- It serves long-
term financial
interests of
shareholders
and/or ownerc
3.72 1.89 – – – 0.76 –
- It limits
reputational
risksc
4.50 1.63 – – – 0.75 –
- Large customers
ask for itc
3.77 1.89 – – – 0.73 –
Environmental
performance
– – – – –
- Energy
consumptiond
0.11 0.23 – – – – 0.87
- Waste disposald 0.13 0.24 – – – – 0.86
- Water
consumptiond
0.10 0.21 – – – – 0.86
Eigenvalue – – 2.56 3.53 1.75 1.00 1.08
(Continued)
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Loadings of 0.50 or greater are considered very significant (Hair, Anderson, and Black
1998). In addition, the Cronbach’s alphas indicate the internal consistency of six fac-
tors, as all meet the accepted threshold of 0.60 (Hair, Anderson, and Black 1998). We
tested the reliability of the factors further by confirmatory factor analysis using struc-
tural equation modeling. The global fit indices (CFA ¼ 0.939; TLI ¼ 0.923; SRMR ¼
0.025) indicate a good model fit. The construct reliability and convergent validity
(measured by the average variance extracted) for all factors satisfied the accepted
thresholds of 0.70 and 0.50, respectively. The predicted factor values identified by the
measurement model are standardized to zero mean and unit standard deviation. We
included these factors in our regression analysis.
4.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and partial correlations of all variables. It
shows that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are both positively related to voluntary
initiatives and environmental performance. Also, government regulation is positively
related to environmental performance. Intrinsic motivation and government regulation
are not significantly related.
4.3. Common method bias
Several precautionary remedies and ex-post tests recommended by Podsakoff et al.
(2003) were used to address common method bias. First of all, in a cover letter to the
respondents, we emphasized confidentiality. Respondents would thus have little motive
to present a more favorable picture than they knew to be the case. As a second precau-
tionary measure, the scales for measuring government regulation, intrinsic motivation
and environmental impacts were all different. This reduces common method biases
caused by commonalities in scale endpoints and anchoring effects. In order to
avoid consistency artifacts between dependent and independent variables (Muller and
Table 1. (Continued).
Factor loadings
Variables Mean SD
Government
regulation
Voluntary
initiatives
Intrinsic
motivation
Extrinsic
motivation
Environmental
performance
Variance
explained
– – 15.06% 20.79% 10.34% 5.90% 6.36%
Cronbach’s alpha – – 0.89 0.85 0.70 0.62 0.87
Construct
reliability
– – 0.94 0.91 0.83 0.79 0.90
Average
variance
extracted
– – 0.83 0.77 0.72 0.56 0.75
Notes: aExtraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser
Normalization.
bMeasured on a binary scale ranging from: ‘no’ (0); ‘yes’ (1).
cMeasured on a 7-point scale ranging from: ‘not at all’(1) to ‘very much’(7).
dMeasured on a 3-point scale: ‘no use of targets, no reporting’ (0.0), ‘use of targets, no reporting’ (0.5); ‘no
use of targets, reporting’ (0.5); ‘use of targets and reporting’ (1.0).
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Kolk 2010), we placed the questions on motivation in the first part of the survey
(questions 23–27), the questions on the causes of environmental improvements in the
last part of the survey (questions 109–111, respectively), and the questions on environ-
mental performance in between (questions 91–93). Fourth, we kept questions simple,
specific and concise, avoiding ambiguous concepts (and testing them in the pilot inter-
views; see above). In addition, we applied an ex-post test for common method bias.
For this, Podsakoff et al. (2003) recommend Harman’s single-factor test through a
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.a
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5
1 Government regulation 0.00 1.00 1 – – – –
2 Voluntary initiatives 0.00 1.00 20.25 1 – – –
3 Intrinsic motivation 0.00 1.00 20.03 0.15 1 – –
4 Extrinsic motivation 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.08 0.30 1 –
5 Environmental performance 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.34 0.19 0.13 1
6 Company size (ln FTE) 3.08 1.68 20.03 0.16 0.04 0.16 0.12
7 External orientationb 4.56 1.48 0.01 20.03 0.14 0.08 0.05
8 Flexibility orientation 5.20 1.36 20.06 0.06 0.27 0.08 0.03
9 Time horizonc 2.60 1.33 20.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07
10 % age 25-50 0.66 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.03 20.02 0.07
11 % employees >50 0.23 0.23 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05
12 % of medium skilled 0.42 0.31 0.03 20.04 20.02 0.02 0.01
13 % of high skilled 0.25 0.29 20.02 20.03 0.09 20.03 20.09
14 B2Cd 1.97 1.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 20.01 0.08
15 Intensity of price competitione 5.06 1.87 0.05 20.07 20.04 20.03 0.01
16 UKf 0.04 0.19 20.03 0.05 20.07 0.06 0.02
17 Scandinaviaf 0.16 0.37 20.06 20.01 0.03 0.11 20.06
18 Continentalf 0.31 0.46 20.11 0.06 0.06 0.05 20.06
19 Centralf 0.11 0.32 20.06 0.02 20.00 20.12 0.05
20 Southf 0.38 0.48 0.20 20.08 20.05 20.08 0.07
21 Materialf 0.17 0.37 20.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.07
22 Energyf 0.03 0.17 20.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03
23 Industrialsf 0.19 0.39 0.04 20.06 20.03 0.00 20.03
24 Consumer discretionairf 0.18 0.39 20.03 20.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
25 Consumer staplesf 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.06 20.01 20.00 0.08
26 Financialsf 0.03 0.16 20.01 20.02 20.01 20.01 20.08
27 IT and Communicationsf 0.04 0.20 20.02 20.03 0.04 20.01 20.09
28 Other businessf 0.33 0.47 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 20.03
Notes: aPearson correlation coefficients; italics p< 0.05; bold p< 0.01.
bResponse to the survey question: “Please characterize your enterprise on the following two scales. The first
scale concerns the organizational focus. This scale ranges from, on the one hand, a strong internal focus on
internal organizational efficiency, to, on the other hand, a strong external focus on adapting to the
(changing) demands of the external environment. The second scale concerns the management style. This
scale ranges from, on the one hand, giving employees clear guidelines, enforced by control mechanisms, to,
on the other hand, providing them complete autonomy and participative decision making.” The responses
are measured by a 7-point Likert scale ranging from: ‘not at all’ (1) to ‘very much’(7).
cResponse to the survey question “What is the average time horizon of the financial targets of your
enterprise?”, measured in years.
dResponse to the survey question “To whom do you sell your products and/or services?”, measured by a 5-
point scale ranging from: ‘B2B’(1) to ‘B2C’(5).
eResponse to the survey question, “In the market for your main product or service, your enterprise is prone
to price competition”. The respondent could choose between seven options, ranging from ‘not at all’ to
‘very much’.
fDummy.
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principal component analysis on all the variables included in the analysis. The basic
assumption of this technique is that if a substantial amount of common method vari-
ance is present, either (a) a single factor will emerge from the factor analysis or (b)
one general factor will account for the majority of the covariance among the measures.
Our principal component analysis revealed five factors with eigenvalues greater than
1.0, which together accounted for 53% of the total variance. The largest factor did not
account for a majority of the variance (20%). This indicates that respondents were not
guided by an inherent bias resulting in homogenous scoring patterns.
4.4. Non-response bias
In order to evaluate the non-response bias, we employed the Heckman two-step esti-
mation procedure (Puhani 2000). Heckman showed that non-response bias is a kind of
omitted variable bias. The omitted variable can be measured by the so-called inverse
Mill’s ratio that captures the influence from unobserved characteristics of the enter-
prise on the response to the survey. The inverse Mill’s ratio can be calculated from the
first step of Heckman’s procedure that estimates a probit model for the response (0 for
non-response; 1 for response) in 2011. In the second step, the ultimate model of inter-
est is estimated. The estimation of the response rate in the first stage should include at
least one variable that does not affect the estimation in the second stage. As exclusion
restriction, we used the degree of feeling European as measured by the Eurobarometer
because the invitation letter that requested companies to respond to the survey was
signed by a representative of the European Union. It is expected that respondents who
feel more European are more inclined to cooperate with the survey, independent of
their interest in CSR. The estimation results of the probit model supported this propos-
ition and showed a highly significant positive effect of feeling European on the
response rate (p< 0.001), controlling for sector, company size and the starting year of
the company. From the regression result, we calculated the inverse Mill’s ratio.5 We
found that the inverse Mill’s ratio is significantly related only to intrinsic motivation.
Based on these results, we concluded that the response for intrinsic motivation is likely
to be susceptible to non-response bias. By including the inverse Mill’s ratio as an extra
control variable in the regression analysis, we removed the selection bias part from the
error terms.
4.5. Test on endogeneity of government regulation
A possible complication for our empirical research is that companies with strongly
motivated business leaders are more likely to go beyond external requirements and
thus are less likely to report that government regulations were the most important
cause for improved environmental performance during the period 2007–2010. The
reverse causality from motivation to the stated impact of government regulation may
bias its estimated impact on intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.
In order to test for reverse causality, we employed the proportion of women man-
agers as instrumental variable for intrinsic motivation. According to the gender social-
ization theory, women demonstrate more concern for others, are more emphatic, and
show more altruistic attitudes (Williams and Polman 2015). Hence, we expect a posi-
tive influence by the proportion of women managers on intrinsic motivation. Multiple
regression analysis (controlling for all other control variables) indeed showed a
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significantly positive effect (t-value ¼ 4.93). For extrinsic motivation, we adopt as
an instrument the intensity of monitoring of the company’s social and environmental
performance by NGOs and the media; in a transparent environment, environmental
performance yields greater strategic market value (Campbell 2007). Multiple regression
analysis (again controlling for all other control variables) showed a significantly posi-
tive effect (t-value ¼ 12.79). When using IV analysis, we found that neither intrinsic
nor extrinsic motivation reversely affect government regulation (p values vary from
0.299 to 0.827). Hence, motivation does not reversely impact on government regulation.
5. Results
This section reports the estimation results for intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation,
voluntary initiatives and environmental performance.
We employed the conditional mixed process (CMP) estimator in order to control
for correlation between the residuals for intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, voluntary
initiatives and environmental performance. The CMP modeling framework is essen-
tially that of seemingly unrelated regressions, but is more general. In particular, the
individual equations need not be classical regressions with a continuous dependent
variable. The dependent variables may also be binary, ordered and categorical or based
on interval measures. CMP can also estimate parameters in mixed-process simultan-
eous systems that are recursive, meaning that endogenous variables may appear on the
right-hand side as observed variables in other equations, as in our model. Conditional
means that the individual model equations can vary by observation.
This last feature of CMP allows us to use different samples for which the crowding
effects may differ. Hungerman (2009) showed that crowding-out effects are stronger if
intrinsic motivation is high. Indeed, only if companies are intrinsically motivated to start
with, can government regulation crowd out intrinsic motivation. We, therefore, distin-
guished two samples. In the first sample, the reference option to which we compare gov-
ernment regulation are those companies for which business leaders had selected
‘voluntary initiatives’ in the survey question as the main cause of environmental
improvements by the company. In this sample, companies for which the business leader
had selected ‘not applicable’ for this survey question are not included. In the second
sample, we employed companies for which the business leader had selected ‘not applic-
able’ as reference option for government regulation. In this sample, companies for which
the business leader had selected ‘voluntary initiatives’ are excluded. Correlation analysis
showed that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of business leaders who had selected ‘not
applicable’ is significantly lower than for business leaders who had selected ‘voluntary
initiatives.’ Accordingly, crowding-out effects from government regulation are less
likely. For the other equations for voluntary initiatives and environmental performance,
we used a sample consisting of all respondents. In these equations, companies whose
business leader had selected the ‘non-applicable’ option are the reference category.
Table 3 presents the estimation results. The estimation results in column (1) of
Table 3 support Hypotheses 1 and 2 that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations stimulate
voluntary initiatives to enhance environmental performance. Columns (2a) and (3a)
report the estimation results explaining motivations for the first sample in which com-
panies that selected ‘voluntary initiatives’ are the reference option. The results show
that government regulation crowds out intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of business
leaders. These results support Hypotheses 3 and 4. Columns (2 b) and (3 b) report the
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estimation results explaining motivations for the second sample in which companies
for which business leaders had selected ‘non applicable’ are the reference option. Once
again, the results indicate crowding out of intrinsic motivation by government regula-
tion, but the magnitude of the crowding effect appears to be much smaller. For extrin-
sic motivation, the crowding-out effects turn into crowding-in effects.
Table 3. Estimation results.a
1
2ab 2bc 3ab 3bc
4
Voluntary
initiatives
Intrinsic
motivation
Extrinsic
motivation
Environmental
performance
Government
regulation
20.28 20.05 20.15 0.07 0.10
Voluntary
initiatives
0.43
Intrinsic motivation 0.75
Extrinsic
motivation
0.41
Company size
(ln FTE)
0.02 0.02 20.07 0.11 0.00 0.06
External orientation 20.09 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.02
Flexibility
orientation
20.11 0.19 0.12 0.03 0.03 20.04
Time horizon 20.01 0.01 20.01 0.00 0.04 0.04
% age 25–50 20.06 20.20 20.13 0.20 20.11 0.09
% employees >50 0.04 20.54 20.32 0.15 20.25 0.03
% of
medium skilled
20.19 0.10 0.20 0.11 0.22 20.02
% of high skilled 20.35 0.31 0.50 0.16 0.12 20.11
Scandinavia 20.53 0.51 0.54 20.11 0.42 0.15
Continental 20.43 0.63 0.50 20.32 0.30 0.34
Central 0.09 0.52 0.24 20.74 20.40 0.26
South 20.37 0.51 0.49 20.41 0.01 0.31
Material 20.01 0.12 0.14 20.06 0.04 0.08
Energy 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.01 20.11 0.06
Industrials 20.09 0.04 0.09 0.02 20.05 0.08
Consumer
discretionair
20.07 0.07 0.07 20.05 0.06 0.09
Consumer staples 0.17 0.03 20.08 20.07 20.03 0.07
Financials 20.02 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.10
IT &
Communications
20.16 0.09 0.09 20.04 20.05 0.07
B2C 0.01 0.02 20.01 20.01 20.09 0.02
Price competition 20.03 20.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 20.01
Inverse Mill’s ratio 20.10 0.24 0.07 20.00 0.03 0.16
R2 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.13
F 7.59 9.61 5.50 7.88 4.37 13.99
N 2,373 1,648 1,046 1,648 1,046 2,373
Notes: a p< 0.05; p< 0.01; p< 0.001.
bReference: companies that filled in ‘voluntary initiatives’ in the survey question on the main cause of the
improvement in environmental performance.
cReference: companies that filled in ‘non-applicable’ in the survey question on the main cause of the
improvement of environmental performance.
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Column (4) shows that government regulation and voluntary initiatives significantly
enhance environmental performance. Voluntary initiatives are substantially more
effective in stimulating environmental performance than is government regulation.
6. Discussion
6.1. Summary of findings and comparison with previous literature
This paper sets out to research to what extent government regulation crowds out intrin-
sic motivation toward environmental performance in SMEs and how the indirect
effects caused by crowding out of intrinsic motivation compare with the direct effects
of government regulation on environmental performance. Table 4 summarizes the main
results for these research objectives. The first column of Table 4 shows the (positive)
direct effects of government regulation on environmental performance from column
(4) of Table 3. The second column reports the indirect effects of government regula-
tion on environmental performance through crowding effects on intrinsic and extrinsic
motivations. The total effects are equal to the sum of the direct and the indirect effects
of government regulation.
For the first sample, Table 4 shows that the negative indirect effect of government
regulation through crowding out intrinsic and extrinsic motivations offsets the direct
positive effect of government regulation. Bowles (2016) calls this ‘strong crowding
out.’ These empirical results confirm the crowding-out mechanism: government regula-
tion significantly harms intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of business leaders, thereby
reducing voluntary initiatives by SMEs to protect the environment. Crowding-out
effects are almost absent in the second sample. Accordingly, the total effect of govern-
ment regulation is substantially positive. This implies that only if intrinsic motivation
is already low to begin with, does government regulation contribute to the environmen-
tal performance of SMEs.
An unexpected outcome of our research is that for companies in the second sam-
ple, government regulation increases rather than reduces extrinsic motivation, which is
opposite to Hypothesis 4. The reason may be that government regulations teach busi-
ness leaders of companies with low environmental performance that improvements
required by government regulations yield financial and other benefits, thereby boosting
extrinsic motivation to enhance environmental performance. Another explanation is
that environmental improvements mandated by government regulations are relatively
costly and that the regulations make business leaders realize that voluntary pro-active
measures might be more cost-efficient.
Our results are in line with previous research concluding that government regula-
tion generates motivation crowding effects on the environmental behavior of rural
households (Cardenas, Stranlund, and Willis 2000; Choi 2015; Han et al. 2018) and
farmers (Vollan 2008), but diverge from the results of Abatayo and Lynham (2016).
They found that government regulation improves environmental performance and inter-
preted this finding as evidence that crowding out of intrinsic motivation does not
occur, although they did not test this explicitly. Our results show that a positive rela-
tionship between government regulation and environmental performance actually can
go together with crowding out of intrinsic motivation. These findings suggest that
Abatayo and Lynham (2016) may have misinterpreted their results as evidence against
crowding out of intrinsic motivation.
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 1349
6.2. Research implications
6.2.1. Theoretical implications
Over the last quarter century, much research has been performed on motives of CSR,
distinguishing between extrinsic and intrinsic motives (Muller and Kolk 2010).
Previous research did not, however, consider that intrinsic motives can depend on
external pressures that drive extrinsic motivations. This study develops a more nuanced
understanding of how external pressures and intrinsic motives relate by advancing the
hypothesis that government regulation impacts on intrinsic motivation. Insight into
motivation crowding effects is important, because disregarding motivation crowding
out leads to overestimation of the influence of government regulations on environmen-
tal performance. This study, therefore, adds to the literature that has studied the effects
of government regulation on environmental innovation by companies (Hunt and Fund
2016), but did not explore the impact of public policy on intrinsic and extrinsic moti-
vations. Our study shows that the effectiveness of government regulation in stimulating
environmental performance of SMEs is contingent on the intrinsic motivation of its
business leaders.
Another important implication of our research is that motivation crowding out may
occur, even if government regulation improves environmental performance. Previous
studies’ assumptions that a positive correlation between government regulation and
environmental performance indicates no crowding out of intrinsic motivation is unwar-
ranted. Our study provides a more refined theoretical analysis of the crowding mechan-
ism by separating it from the direct effects of government regulation on environmental
performance. It provides empirical evidence that a positive relationship between gov-
ernment regulation and environmental performance does not exclude crowding out of
intrinsic motivation. The reason is that the negative effects of motivation crowding out
on environmental performance can be offset by the positive direct effects of govern-
ment regulation on environmental quality.
Third, our research indicates that future theoretical research should distinguish
between situations with high and low intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, empirical
research should test for non-linearity to check whether crowding out effects increase
with the level of intrinsic motivation. More generally, it is important to increase our
understanding of the specific conditions in which motivation crowding out is more
likely to occur. For example, the signal sent by government regulations can vary
Table 4. Direct, indirect and total effects of regulation on environmental performance.a
Indirect effect
Direct effect
Through
intrinsic
motivation
Through
extrinsic
motivation Total Total effect
Reference: voluntary initiatives
Government
regulation
0.10 20.09 20.03 20.12 20.02
Reference: no voluntary initiatives
Government
regulation
0.10 20.01 0.01 20.01 0.09
Note: a p< 0.01; p< 0.001.
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considerably depending on the meaning they convey. This meaning may depend,
among other things, on the cultural context.
6.2.2. Policy implications
As alternatives for legal requirements, several alternative governance instruments may
respect the intrinsic motivation to protect public goods. Campbell (2007), for example,
advocates regulations based on consensus-building among companies, government and
other relevant stakeholders. This is in line with previous experimental studies that
showed that crowding effects decline if regulation respects the self-determination of
participants (Vollan 2008) and facilitates communication (Abatayo and Lynham 2016).
From a motivation crowding perspective, it indeed seems crucial to seek cooperation
with the stakeholders by respecting their legitimate concerns, engaging their moral
preferences, and allowing businesses discretion on how to enhance the public good.
A second policy implication of our results is that it is important to estimate the
importance of intrinsic motivation, before any government regulation is implemented.
If only a few business leaders are intrinsically motivated to begin with, government
regulation cannot crowd out intrinsic motivation. But if intrinsic motivation is strong,
government regulation should be handled with care. This further underlines the import-
ance of measuring intrinsic motivation, not only for research objectives, but also for
policy objectives.
A related implication of our research is that government regulation may want to
focus on setting minimum requirements for environmental performance. In this way, it
will enhance the environmental performance of companies that have not taken volun-
tary initiatives because of low intrinsic or extrinsic motivation. In our sample, almost
50% of all companies belong to this group.6 Our estimation results indicate that
crowding-out effects from government regulation are largely absent in this group. It
should be noted that government regulation often involves setting minimum require-
ments. This explains why, in our sample, the proportion of companies that identified
government regulation as the main reason for their improvements in environmental
performance varies between only 6% for water consumption and 8% for waste disposal
(see Table 1). For countries with little or no environmental regulation, our policy
advice is for the government to introduce minimum requirements to compel companies
that lag behind to improve their environmental performance. This allows companies
that are frontrunners in reducing environmental harm to retain the scope to distinguish
themselves from other companies by expressing their commitment to social responsi-
bility through voluntary initiatives.
6.3. Limitations and future research directions
Our study suffers from several limitations. First of all, our research is limited to busi-
ness leaders of SMEs. The scope of crowding theory would be extended further if it
could be shown to be applicable to large companies as well. More theoretical and
empirical research is needed to study motivations in large organizations.
Another limitation of our research is the use of cross-company survey data.
Although our dataset is unique (no other such large, multi-country, dataset of CSR for
SMEs exists to date), experimental research that explicitly measures intrinsic motiv-
ation would be a useful complement for testing motivation crowding effects.
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Moreover, the use of survey data rather than data on actual environmental performance
may be problematic. The results should thus be interpreted with some caution, even
though self-reported data are common in the literature (Arimura, Hibiki, and Katayama
2008). Moreover, we adopted several precautionary remedies and ex-post tests in order
to address common method and non-response bias.
A final limitation is that the results of this study are based on European data. Our
findings should ideally also be tested in other parts of the world.
Notes
1. Demirel, Iatridis, and Kesidou (2018) found that effective environmental protection entails
collaboration between government regulation and voluntary environmental measures.
Coercive legislation does not leave much room for flexibility and voluntary choices by
managers and frequently pushes the manager to adopt environmental measures without
considering effectiveness (Daddi, Testa, and Frey 2016). Both Daddi, Testa, and Frey
(2016) and Demirel, Iatridis, and Kesidou (2018) did not, however, analyze effects of
government regulation on intrinsic motivations.
2. However, Rode, Gomez-Baggethun, and Krause (2015) provide several arguments that
government regulation can also crowd-in intrinsic motivation. One of the arguments is that
it is easier for intrinsically motivated companies to act upon their motivation if the
government regulation creates a level playing field by compelling companies that are not
intrinsically motivated to invest in environmental improvements.
3. The total number of companies in the 12 countries equals 16,091,476 (Source: EU, http://ec.
europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/performance-review/index_en.htm#h2-1).
4. If the survey question had been phrased as “How important are the following motives for
your enterprise to engage in environmental performance?”, the survey questions would also
pick up that, with regulation, the weight of intrinsic motivation in overall motivation would
decline. Our survey question, however, refers to CSR only, which is limited to the
voluntary part of the environmental performance. As a result, the survey question measures
a decline in intrinsic motivation itself, rather than a reduction in the weight of
intrinsic motivation.
5. We used the transformation proposed by Lee (1983) to transform probabilities into pseudo-
probit scores for calculating the inverse Mill’s ratio.
6. This information can be derived from Table 1. The complement of the sum of the shares of
companies that filled in either ‘enforced by legal requirements,’ or ‘due to own voluntary
initiatives’ equals 40% for energy consumption, 49% for waste disposal and 46% for water
consumption.
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